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We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation
for the object is private information to each bidder. The crucial feature is that one bidder
is favored by the allocation rule in the sense that he need not bid as much as the other
bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as
overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important
implications on equilibrium behavior. We fully characterize the equilibrium strategies
for this auction format and show that there exists a unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium.
Keywords: All-pay auction, contest, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking, asym-
metric information
JEL-Classiﬁcation: D44, D881I n t r o d u c t i o n
Motivation and results Auctions in which bidders compete for one unit of an
indivisible good have been widely studied in recent years. Although the models diﬀer
along many dimensions, one common feature is that the object is awarded to the bidder
who submits the highest bid. Contrary to that, our paper analyzes a two-player all-pay
auction with incomplete information in which the highest bid does not necessarily win
the auction. Instead, the allocation rule is asymmetric in the sense that one bidder is
favored as he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously,
the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as overbidding the rival may not be enough
to win the auction.
The empirical signiﬁcance of our setting comes from the well-known fact that all-pay
auction are strategically equivalent to discriminatory contests. In discriminatory contests,
each party exerts costly eﬀort to compete with other parties for a prize, and the party
who outbids all of their competitors wins the contest and receives the prize. In reality,
the allocation rule in discriminatory contests is often asymmetric in the sense described
above. For example, in German procurement auctions, although local authorities are
obliged to choose the bidders with the lowest price, there is a clause according to which
it can award the contract to a local bidder when this bidder’s price is not more than 5
per cent higher than the lowest bidder’s price. As a second example, consider the ”in
dubio pro reo”-rule in criminal law. According to this rule, a defendant will only be
convicted if his lawyer presents considerably less quantity and quality of evidence than
the prosecutor. Finally, assume that an enterprise hires a consulting ﬁrm, and suppose
that ﬁrm A has a done some excellent in-house consulting before. Then, we often observe
in reality that a potential entrant B is awarded the contract only if the quality of its
proposal is considerably above the quality of A’s proposal. Note that this can indeed
be interpreted as an all-pay auction, because each ﬁrm (and not only the winner) has to
exert eﬀort to prepare a proposal.
To the best of our knowledge, these kind of asymmetric discriminatory contests have
not yet been analyzed in a general framework.1 In this paper, we fully characterize
1See the literature review below.
1the equilibrium strategies for this two-player all pay auction with handicaps when each
bidder’s valuation is private information. We show that there exists a unique pure strategy
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Two further results are also worth emphasizing: ﬁrst, the
revenue equivalence theorem does not apply in our setting, since the bidder with the
higher valuation will not win the auction with certainty. Second, although it is generally
possible that the handicapped player bids more than the favored bidder if the valuations
are identical, we show that it is not possible that the handicapped player wins the auction
when his valuation is lower than the favored bidder’s valuation. Hence, an ineﬃcient
allocation of the object can only result when the favored bidder wins the auction although
he has the lower valuation.
Literature There is a large recent literature analyzing the all-pay auction: Baye,
Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) provide a complete analysis of the all-pay auction under
complete information. With asymmetric information, Krishna and Morgan (1997) extend
the classic model by Milgrom and Weber (1982) where signals are generally aﬃliated to
also include the ﬁrst and the second price all-pay auctions. Lizzeri and Persico (2000)
analyze under which conditions there exist unique pure strategy equilibria in general
auction games, including the all-pay auction.2 Amann and Leininger (1996) and Maskin
and Riley (2000) consider auctions in which bidders are asymmetric in the sense that the
valuations for each bidder are drawn from diﬀerent distributions. This also implies that
the bidder with the highest valuation does no longer win the object with certainty. While
Maskin and Riley (2000) conﬁne attention to winner-pay auctions, our paper is more
related to Amann and Leininger (1996) as they analyze the all-pay auction. Moreover,
we adopt and extend their approach for determining the equilibrium bidding strategies
from a system of diﬀerential equations. As stated above, in all these papers and contrary
to our model, the winner of the auction is the high bidder.
In contrast to the auction literature, there are a few papers considering contests with
handicaps. Konrad (2002) assumes that handicaps arise from the fact that incumbents
need to spend less resources in order to win the discriminatory contest. However, he
2The issue of existence of pure-strategy equilibria in a more general class of simultanous games with
asymmetric information is also extensively analyzed in Athey (2001).
2restricts attention to complete information, so that only mixed strategy equilibria exist.
In the context of bribery games, Clark and Riis (2000) consider an all-pay auction where
two players compete for a government contract awarded by a corrupt oﬃcial. In such
a setting, the authors show that the auctioneer can increase his expected revenue by
introducing asymmetry in our sense. However, they conﬁne attention to the case where
valuations for the contract are uniformly distributed. Bernardo, Talley, and Welch (2000)
analyze a litigation game where the litigants’ evidence is unequally weighed by the court.
Since evidence production is costly, this leads in fact to a contest with handicaps. How-
ever, the game is a modelled as a Tullock contest, where each player wins the price with
some probability depending on his eﬀort (or bid).3 This is diﬀerent from our approach
since the identity of the winner is stochastic even for given bids.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the basic model is
presented. Section 3 derives the equilibrium strategies and contains our main results. In
section 4 we discuss an example, while section 5 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
Basic Setup We consider a private value all-pay auction where 2 risk-neutral bid-
ders indexed i =1 ,2 compete for a single object to be sold. Each bidder has valuation
vi ∈ [0,1] drawn from a common distribution function F(v) ∈ C1 satisfying F(0) = 0
where the density function F 0(v) is positive valued on (0,1). The realization of vi (bidder
i’s ”type”) is private information to bidder i. We analyze equilibria in which the bidding
strategy of bidder i is a function of his type, i.e. bi :[ 0 ,1] → <
+
0 .
The speciﬁc feature of this auction is the allocation rule: Denoting by W ∈ {1,2} the
identity of the winner, we have




where a coin is ﬂipped in case that b1 = t · b2 holds so that each bidder wins with
3To illustrate, in the simplest symmetric two-person Tullock contest, player i exerts eﬀort ei and
wins with probability πi = ei
ei+ej. In the asymmetric version considered by Bernardo, Talley, and Welch
(2000), the probability is πi = tei
tei+ej where t 6=1 .
3probability 1
2. Thus, bidder 1 wins the auction only if he bids at least t-times as much as
bidder 2, while bidder 2 wins if he bids at least 1
t-times as much as bidder 1. Without
loss of generality we conﬁne attention to the case t ≥ 1. Therefore, bidders 1 and 2 will
be referred to as the ”handicapped” and the ”favored” bidder, respectively.4 Clearly, for
t =1this is simply the standard all-pay auction with private values. The value of t is
commonly known.
Payoﬀs Following the setup of the model, for given bids b1 and b2,p a y o ﬀsa r e
π1(b1,b 2,v 1;t)=

   
   
v1 − b1 if b1 >t b 2
1
2v1 − b1 if b1 = tb2





   
   
v2 − b2 if b2 > 1
tb1
1
2v2 − b2 if b2 = 1
tb1
−b2 if b2 < 1
tb1
.( 3 )
Finally, expected payoﬀs are denoted by Πi and given by
Π1(b1,b 2,v 1;t)=v1 Pr(b1 >t b 2(v2)) − b1 (4)
and
Π2(b1,b 2,v 2;t)=v2 Pr(b2 >
1
t
b1(v1)) − b2.( 5 )
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Since this is a static game with incomplete information, the equilibrium concept used
is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). A vector of bids (b∗
1(v1),b ∗
2(v2)) is a BNE if the
4Note that the asymmetry here refers to the allocation rule. This is diﬀerent to ”asymmetric auctions”
in the sense of Amann and Leininger (1996) and Maskin and Riley (2000), where the valuations v1 and
v2 are drawn from diﬀerent distributions.







j(vj);t) for all bi ∈ <
+
0 and i,j 6= i =1 ,2. (6)
In equilibrium, no bidder must be able to increase his expected payoﬀ by choosing a
bidding strategy other than b∗
i(vi), given that the opponent adheres to his equilibrium
strategy. The following deﬁnition proves useful for further reference:
Deﬁnition 1 Consider some function x : A → <.T h e nd e ﬁne: Dx := {a ∈ A : x(a) ∈
<+}.
The restricted domain Dx(a) contains only those elements a in A whose image x(a)
is positive. We can then state the following result concerning the properties of the
equilibrium bidding strategies:
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium Bidding Strategies) b∗
i : Dbi → (0,b i(1)] is a monotone in-
creasing bijection on a non-empty set Dbi ⊆ [0,1] and diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Uniqueness of Equilibrium We ﬁrst show that in this framework an equilibrium
is unique whenever it exists. The issue of existence is addressed below. Note that Lemma
1 also ensures existence of the inverse mapping ρi :[ 0 ,b ∗
i(1)] → Dbi, i.e. ρi(b) ≡ b
−1
i (b)
is the valuation bidder i must have in order to bid b. Equipped with this result we can
now characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies in more detail. The maximization
problem for bidder 1 when bidder 2 is playing some strategy b2(v2) is given by
max
b1
v1 · Pr(b1 >t· b2(v2)) − b1 = v1 · F(ρ2(
b1
t
)) − b1,( 7 )
while for bidder 2, when bidder 1 is playing strategy b1(v1) we have
max
b2
v2 · Pr(b2 >
1
t
· b1(v1)) − b2 = v2 · F(ρ1(t · b2)) − b2.( 8 )
The ﬁrst order conditions to these maximization problems lead to the following system of
















=1 .( 9 )
v2 · F
0(ρ1(t · b2(v2))) · ρ
0
1(t · b2(v2)) · t =1 . (10)
For a given set of initial conditions, this system determines a unique trajectory of bidding
strategies as it is Lipschitz continuous for vi > 0. That there is only a single pair of
initial conditions (such that a solution to Eqns. (9) and (10) is indeed unique) follows
from the following results concerning the properties of the equilibrium bid distributions
Gi=1,2 := F(ρi(b∗
i(vi))) : DGi → [0,1]:5
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Bid Distributions) In any BNE, the bid distributions G1
and G2 have the following properties:
(i) DG1 =( 0 ,b ∗
1(1)] and DG2 =( 0 ,b ∗
2(1)] where b∗
1(1) = t · b∗
2(1).
(ii) Gi is continuous and strictly monotone increasing ∀i =1 ,2.
(iii) If Gi(0) > 0,t h e nGj6=i(0) = 0.
(iv) There is a single set of admissible initial conditions.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Part (i) of the Lemma characterizes one main diﬀerence of an all-pay auction with
handicaps compared to the standard model where t =1holds. Clearly, it can never be
optimal for bidder 2 (the favored bidder) to submit bids larger than 1
t-times the maximum
bid of bidder 1 (the handicapped bidder) since he already wins with probability one when
bidding b2 = 1
t · b1(1). Part ii) establishes that, in equilibrium, bid distributions must
ensure that no bidder can increase his expected proﬁt by submitting a lower bid while
leaving the probability of winning the auction unchanged which is due to the all-pay rule.
Part iii) says that only one bidder’s bid function can have an atom at zero. Intuitively,
this follows from the fact that, given that one bidder’s bid function has an atom at zero,
the other bidder can always be better of by bidding some x>0 whenever his valuation
is positive. As one consequence, the coexistence of diﬀerent sets of admissible initial
c o n d i t i o n si sr u l e do u ta ss t a t e di np a r ti v ) .
5Similar statements for the case t =1have for example been derived by Amann and Leininger (1996).
6Existence of Equilibrium Rather than modifying equation system (9) and (10)
directly, we extend the method adopted by Amann and Leininger (1996) who have an-
alyzed the case t =1for valuations v1 and v2 drawn from diﬀerent distributions. The
advantage of this method is that it simpliﬁes the problem of simultaneously solving a
system of diﬀerential equations into a sequential procedure. This enables us to prove our
main result:
Theorem 1 There exists a unique pure-strategy Bayesian Nash-Equilibrium in which






t · k(V )F
0(V )dV (11)












t · k(v1;t) · F 0(v1)
v1 · F 0(k(v1;t))
. (13)
Proof. Using a bijection k : Db1 → Db2,t h eﬁrst order conditions (9) and (10)
can be transformed into a set of diﬀerential equations expressed in a single variable v1.















0(ρ1(t · b2(k(v1)))) · ρ
0
1(t · b2(k(v1))) · t =1 . (15)













= k(v1) · F
0(ρ1(t · b2(k(v1))) · ρ
0
1(t · b2(k(v1)) · t. (16)




















Thus, k(v) maps every type of bidder 1 onto that type of bidder 2 who bids 1/t- times as
much as bidder 1. Note that due to our previous results and together with the appropriate
boundary condition k(1) = 1,E q n .( 1 7 )d e ﬁnes indeed a bijection between the domains
of the diﬀerent strategies which is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere. Using Eqn. (17)











































Finally, as ρ1(b1(v1)) = v1, it follows that ρ0
1(b1)=dv1








t · k(v1;t) · F 0(v1)
v1 · F 0(k(v1;t))
. (20)
The boundary condition k(1;t) ≡ 1 and the assumptions on F(v) guarantee a unique












= t · k(v1;t) · F
0(v1) (21)
8where the last step follows from Eqn. (15). Together with b1(k−1(0)) = 0 and the















as stated in the Theorem.
Ineﬃcient Allocation when t>1 Clearly, the allocation of the object in our
auction does not only depend on the two bidders valuations but also on the allocation
rule expressed by t. Hence, we can not exclude that the object is awarded to a bidder
whose valuation is lower than his competitor’s valuation. Furthermore, without further
assumptions on the distribution function F(·) (see the example below), we can not say
if the favored or the handicapped player bids more for identical valuations. However, we
can show that the handicapped player will never win the auction if his valuation is lower.
This means that, even if he may bid more aggressively for particular distribution functions
and for particular valuations, this can never outweigh his handicap. It follows that an
ineﬃcient allocation of the object can only result when bidder 2 (the favored bidder)
wins the auction although he has a lower valuation. This is expressed in the following
Proposition, where W∗ ∈ {1,2} denotes the identity of the winner in equilibrium:
Proposition 1 i) In any BNE, there can only exist the case where v1 >v 2 but W∗ =2 ,
while the case where v2 >v 1 but W∗ =1does not occur with positive probability.










k(v1;t)(v2 − v1)F 0(v2)dv2F 0(v1)dv1 < 0 if k(v1;t) <v 1
0 otherwise
. (24)
iii) This expected equilibrium welfare loss is the greater for large values of t, i.e. dL∗
dt < 0.
9Proof. See Appendix 3.
With respect to the welfare loss expressed in parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1, we
have simply calculated the conditional expectation of the diﬀerence in the valuations of
player 2 and 1, given that v2 − v1 < 0, and that player 2 nevertheless wins the auction.
Although this seems to be a natural deﬁnition of the welfare loss, one has to keep in mind
that asymmetries are often introduced for welfare concerns not explicitly modelled here.6
4A n E x a m p l e
To better understand the impact of the asymmetry generated by t>1 on the bidders’
behavior, we consider the special case where the vi are uniformly distributed, i.e. F(v)=






Using standard techniques, the solution has the form of some polynomial k(v1;t)=αv
β
1+γ
which leads to k(v1;t)=vt






























t+1and G2 = ((1+t)b∗
2)
t
t+1 w h i c hb o t hs a t i s f y
Gi(0) = 0 (and hence are atomless) and Gi(b∗(1)) = 1. Clearly, b∗
i(vi;t) is increasing in
vi satisfying b∗
i(0) = 0. Moreover, the equilibrium bidding strategies satisfy the support
constraint b∗
1(1) = t
t+1 = t · b∗
2(1) = 1
1+t as required by Lemma 2. For the comparative
statics with respect to t, the results are not as clear-cut: The following ﬁgure shows
6For instance, in the consulting example described in the introduction, the enterprise introduces an
asymmetry because it has a positive ex ante bias for one ﬁrm.
10b∗






2468 1 0 t
Figure 1: b∗
2(v2 = 1
3) as a function of t.
The intuition for this non-monotonicity result is best explained by looking at marginal
costs and beneﬁts from increasing bi: Since marginal cost is always equal to 1 due to the
all-pay rule, we can safely conﬁne attention to the analysis of marginal beneﬁt. Given
bidder 1’s equilibrium strategy b∗
1(v1;t), bidder 2’s expected beneﬁt( p a y o ﬀ net of cost)
is v2 · Pr(b2 > 1
tb∗
1(v1;t)).W h e nt increases by ∆t,t h e r ea r et w oe ﬀects: i) bidder 2 wins
the auction not only in case that b2 > 1
tb∗
1(·) but already when b2 > 1
t+∆tb∗
1(·).T h i se ﬀect
(the ”direct eﬀect”) unambiguously increases the marginal beneﬁt for bidder 2 and thus
his equilibrium bid. ii) as t changes, also b∗
1(v1;t) changes by d
dtb∗
1(v1;·)· ∆t and this also
eﬀects the probability of winning and thus the marginal beneﬁt from increasing b2 (the
7For a formal description of the comparative statics analysis with respect to t,d e ﬁne tmax
i (vi) ∈
argmaxt b∗









2 v1 − 4lnv1
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1 (v1)=1⇔ v1 = e− 1
2. Finally, limv1→1 tmax
1 (v1)=∞,s ot h a tb∗
1(v1;t) is monotone
decreasing in t for 0 ≤ v1 ≤ e− 1
2, a concave function in t with an interior maximum at tmax
1 (v1) for
e− 1
2 <v 1 < 1 and strictly increasing in t if v1 =1 .










2 v2 − 4lnv2
¢
which is strictly decreasing in v2.A s tmax
2 (v2)=1⇔ v2 = e− 1
2 and limv2→0 tmax
2 (v2)=∞, it follows
that b∗
2(v2;t) is monotone increasing in t if v2 =0 , a concave function in t with an interior maximum at
tmax
2 (v2) for 0 <v 2 <e − 1
2, and strictly decreasing in t if v2 ≥ e− 1
2.
11”indirect eﬀect”). When d
dtb∗
1(v1;t) > 0, then competition gets tougher which increases
the marginal beneﬁts ot h a tb o t he ﬀe c t sg oi nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o n( a si ss h o w ni nf o o t n o t e
4, a region where d
dtb∗
1(v1;t) > 0 does not exist for all v1).8 As t becomes large, then
eventually d
dtb∗
1(v1;t) < 0, so that competition gets weaker and marginal beneﬁtf r o m
increasing b2 decreases. When this eﬀect is so strong that it overcompensates the direct
eﬀect, then b∗
2(v2;t) also decreases.9 An analogous argument holds for bidder 1,e x c e p t
that the direct eﬀect always leads to lower marginal beneﬁta sh ed o e sn ol o n g e rw i n
whenever b1 >t· b∗
2(·) but only when b1 > (t + ∆t) · b∗
2(·).
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have analyzed a two-player all-pay auction where one bidder is handi-
capped by the auction rule while the other is favored. The relevance of our analysis is due
to the fact that all-pay auctions are strategically equivalent to discriminatory contests
where these asymmetries are often observed in reality. We have shown that there exists a
unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore, it is impossible that the handicapped
player wins the auction when he has a lower valuation. Whether the equilibrium bidding
strategy of each bidder is increasing or decreasing in t depends on t itself, on bidder i’s
valuation vi,a n do nF(·).
Coming back to the strategic equivalence of all-pay auctions and discriminatory con-
tests, one can also interpret the bids as (socially useless) eﬀorts undertaken to secure a
rent. Then, it would be an interesting extension to compare the welfare loss from the
allocation ineﬃciencies caused by the possibility of the favored party winning the contest
even if it has the lower valuation to the welfare gain from the fact that total eﬀort may
be lower in such a contest with handicaps. However, one would then have also to take
into account that handicaps are frequently introduced because the contest designer has a
speciﬁc utility function. For instance, he explicitly wants to support local suppliers, or he
8The point is that increasing the bid becomes less attractive if the probability of winning is already
high, since the probability is only increasing at a decreasing rate at least up from a certain point (this
follows simply from the fact that the winning probability is bounded above by one).
9Thus, in the terminology of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), bids are ”strategic
complements”.
12may believe that penalizing an innocent defendant is worse than acquitting a defendant
who is guilty.
Appendix
1 Proof of Lemma 1
To prove the several characteristics of bidding strategies, we proceed in three steps.
First, we show that the structure of the payoﬀ function induces non-decreasing strate-
gies. Together with continuity, this in turn implies strict monotonicity and therefore
diﬀerentiability and bijectivity on the restricted domain Dbi.
As a ﬁrst step consider monotonicity. For any v0
i,v i ∈ [0,1] and for v0
i >v i incentive
compatibility requires

















i),v i) ≥ Πi(bi(vi),v
0
i) − Πi(bi(vi),v i).





1) >t· b2) ≥ (v
0








· b1) ≥ (v
0




But this only holds if bi(v0
i) ≥ bi(vi) which proves monotonicity.
We will prove continuity by contradiction. Assume that b1 is not continuous at x ∈
(0,b 1(1)). Stated diﬀerently b1(x) > lim²→0b1(x − ²) ≡ b1(x). This implies, that bidder 2
will not submit some bid b2 ∈ (b1(x)/t,b1(x)/t) as he can always reduce costs while the
probability to win the auction remains unchanged. Anticipating this, there is no reason
for bidder 1 to increase bids from b1(x) to b1(x). Hence, we end up with a contradiction.
13Note, that the same result can be derived for the continuity of strategies of the favored
player by a permutation of indices and the appropriate modiﬁcation of probabilities to
win the auction. Furthermore, as F 0(v) 6=0∀v 6=0 , this result holds for the entire
interval of valuations.
Now assume that bi(vi) is not strictly increasing on the restricted domain Dbi.T h a t
means, there is an interval I ⊆ (0,1] of ﬁnite length with bi(vi) ≡ b > 0∀vi ∈ I.G i v e n
such a strategy proﬁle of bidder i,b i d d e rj maximizes his expected payoﬀ as given by
Eqn. (5). To be speciﬁc, let i =1and j =2 . Now assume bidder 2 bids (b − ²)/t.T h e n
his pay-oﬀ is
v2 Pr(b − ²>b 1) − (b − ²)/t
(with an appropriate valuation v2). Now assume bidder 2 bids (b + ²)/t instead. His
expected pay-oﬀ function is then
v2 Pr(b + ²>b 1) − (b + ²)/t
Bidder 2 proﬁts from such a deviation as can be seen when ² → 0
lim
²→0
(v2 Pr(b1 >b + ²) − (b + ²)/t − (v2 Pr(b1 >b− ²) − (b − ²)/t))
= lim
²→0




= v2 Pr(b1 = b) > 0
Therefore bidder 2 will always bid slightly above b/t instead of slightly below, but that
contradicts continuity. Analogously, a gap in bidding strategies of bidder 1 can be deduced
from a plateau in bidder 2’s equilibrium strategies. This proves strict monotonicity on
the restricted domain. Therefore bidding strategies are diﬀerentiable almost everywhere
and a bijection from the restricted domain Dbi onto (0,b i(1)].F i n a l l y , Dbi has to be
non-empty, as it can never be part of an equilibrium that both bidders or only one bidder
send zero bids for the entire valuation space.
142 Proof of Lemma 2
Part i) Clearly, bi(0) = 0 determines the lower bound of DGi. Moreover, denoting by
bmax
i the maximum bid of bidder i, it follows from Lemma 1 that ρ(bmax
i )=m a x {vi} =1
must hold for bidder i. This implies that bidder 1 can never be better oﬀ by bidding
too high, i.e. b1 ≤ t · bmax
2 has to hold. Analogously, neither will bidder 2 bid more
than necessary to win the auction with probability 1, i.e. b2 ≤ 1
t · bmax
1 has to hold. Of
course, this must also be true for bmax
1 and bmax
2 , respectively, i.e. bmax
















from which it follows that bmax
2 = 1
t · bmax
1 or equivalently, bmax
1 = t · bmax
2 must hold. We
r e f e rt ot h i sa st h eﬁnal condition.
Part ii) Follows immediately from our assumptions on F(v) and Lemma 1.
Part iii) Suppose, Gj(0) = g>0. We show that, for all vi ∈ [0,1],t h e r ei ss o m e
positive bid x>0 for bidder i such that he is strictly better oﬀ than with bidding bi =0 :
With bi =0 , bidder i’s loses whenever bj > 0 (which happens with probability (1 − g))
wins with probability 1
2 whenever bj =0(which happens with probability g)s ot h a th i s
expected payoﬀ is simply vi ·
g
2. When submitting a positive bid x>0,h ew i n sw i t h
certainty when bj =0and, depending on x (and t), may even win when bj > 0.T h u sw e
have:




where the last inequality holds whenever x<
g
2 · vi,s ot h a tf o ra l lvi > 0,t h e r ee x i s t
x>0 which satisﬁes this condition.
Part iv) As the ﬁrst order conditions consist of two ordinary ﬁrst order diﬀerential
equations which are Lipschitz continuous for vi > 0, any set of initial conditions (bi(vi)=
ci,i =1 ,2) determines unique trajectories bi(vi). In the following, we show that part
15(i) and part (iii) together with the so-called no-crossing property of equilibrium bids
(see Lizzeri and Persico (2000)) implies, that there is only one admissible set of initial
conditions.
First note, that the ﬁnal condition in part (i) reduces the freedom to choose initial
conditions by one, as for a given bi(1), bj6=i(1) is ﬁxed. On the other hand part (iii) requires
that at least one bidder i sends ﬁnite bids for every positive valuation bi(vi) > 0∀vi > 0.
Consequently, for two sets of initial conditions to co-exist, in at least one set one of
the bidder’s bid-distributions has to have an atom at zero. Furthermore, one of the two
following properties of the corresponding equilibrium bid functions would have to hold.10
(a) The atom of one bidder’s bid distribution is smaller against a tougher strategy of his
opponent. (b) At least one bidder bids the same for a given valuation against two distinct
opponent’s strategies. In the following we show that none of the two requirements can
be fulﬁlled in equilibrium.
As to (a), consider the ﬁrst order conditions for vi given by F(vi) ≡ Gi(0) and denoting








e Gj(0) = 1
But (a) requires that d
dbGj(0) > d
db e Gj(0) and vi > e vi are satisﬁed simultaneously which
is a contradiction to the structure of the ﬁrst order conditions.
A similar argument contradicts (b). The ﬁrst order conditions 11 for player 1 with









can not be fulﬁlled simultaneously. Therefore co-existing sets of initial conditions are not
10To see this it suﬃces to plot ρi against bi for i =1 ,2 as detailed in Lizzeri and Persico (2000).
11Once again we restrict ourselves to the favored bidder without loss of generality as the argument is
independent of t.
16feasible.
3 Proof of Proposition 1
Part i) As for the ﬁrst case, in any BNE, bidder 1 loses the auction whenever
Pr(b∗
1(v1) <t· b∗
2(v2)) = Pr(v2 >k (v1;t)) which simply follows from the deﬁnition of
k(v1;t):S i n c ek(v1;t) gives that type of bidder 2 who bids 1
t−t i m e sa sm u c ha sb i d d e r1
(which would result in a tie), bidder 1 loses the auction whenever v2 >k (v1;t).I no r d e r
to violate Pareto eﬃciency, also v1 >v 2 m u s th o l d .A sw eh a v es e e nf o rt h es y m m e t r i c
case with t =1 ,d i ﬀerential equation (20) leads to k(v1;1)=v1 so that we would have
Pr(v2 >v 1)=0whenever v1 >v 2. We now show that k(v1;t) as given by (20) will be
decreasing in t,s ot h a tf o ra l lt>1 there may exist v1,v 2 such that Pr(v2 >k (v1;t)) > 0
even when v1 >v 2. It then follows from that the (unique) solution to Eqn. (20) satisfying














Clearly, this equation is continuous is k and t and its derivative with respect to k is












du ≤ 0. (30)




1(v1)) = Pr(k−1(v2;t) <v 1). Again, for this outcome not to be eﬃcient, we must
also have v2 >v 1.A g a i n , f o r t =1we get k−1(v2;1) = v2 from which it follows that
Pr(v2 <v 1)=0when v2 >v 1. However, contrary to the ﬁrst case, we can show that
k−1(v2;t) is increasing in t, so that this condition can never be satisﬁed for all t>1











du ≥ 0. (31)
17Part ii) For any v1 ∈ [0,1], a welfare loss occurs whenever bidder 2 has the lower
valuation, but wins the object. Thus, by deﬁnition of k(v1;t),b i d d e r1 loses whenever
v2 >k (v1;t) holds. It follows that for all values of v2 satisfying k(v1;t) <v 2 <v 1,w eg e t
aw e l f a r el o s s(v2 − v1) < 0. Taking expectations over v1 then yields Eqn. (24).









as it was shown in Eqn. (30) that k(v1;t) is decreasing in t.
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